







1. Grounding Enthusiasm, Grounding Skepticism, 
and the Central Question 
Grounding enthusiasts (also known as “groundhogs”, see Fine 2020) tell us that something is to 
be gained by recognizing that certain factual connections and/or certain nonfactual connec­
tions are all grounding connections. Often, phenomena such as those in (1) are cited as putative 
examples of factual grounding connections, while phenomena such as those in (2) are cited as 
putative examples of nonfactual grounding connections:1 
(1) a.   Moral/Natural: The fact that an act is a telling of a lie grounds the fact that the act is 
morally wrong. 
b. Truthmaking: The truth of the proposition that snow is white is grounded in the exist
ence of the state of affairs, snow’s being white. 
c. Logical Cases: The fact that the ball is red grounds the fact that the ball is red or round. 
d. Determinate/Determinable: The fact that the ball is crimson grounds the fact that the 
ball is red. 
e. Genus/Species: The fact that this geometrical figure is a square is grounded in the fact 
that this geometrical figure is an equilateral rectangle. 
(2) a.  Sets/Member s: The singleton set containing Socrates is grounded in its sole member,  
Socrates. 
b. Holes/Hosts: The holes in a piece of Swiss cheese are grounded in the piece of Swiss 
cheese in which they reside. 
c. Abundant/Sparse Properties:  The abundant property,  grueness, is grounded in some 
combination of sparse properties. 
d. Boundaries: The boundary around a football field is grounded in the football field it 
delimits. 
e. Tropes: A rose’s redness trope is grounded in the rose in which it is present. 
­
Although the factual and nonfactual connections cited in (1) and (2) are here expressed using the 
grounding idiom, this formulation in itself should by no means be regarded as an endorsement 
of or as straightforward evidence in favor of grounding enthusiasm.These same connections can 
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also be expressed using other connectives, such as “in virtue of”,“because”,“is explained by”, 
“is made the case by”, or “depends on”, instead of “is grounded in”. Regardless of the terminol­
ogy we use to state the connections at issue, the grounding enthusiast’s claim that these (and/or 
other) examples are in fact best viewed as grounding connections is a substantive claim and one 
that is contested by those who dispute the theoretical utility of the grounding idiom. (More in 
what follows on the method of giving examples of alleged grounding connections in support 
of grounding enthusiasm.) 
What exactly are we supposed to learn from the grounding enthusiast’s alleged insight that 
factual and/or nonfactual connections such as those cited in (1) and (2) are all grounding con­
nections? In what follows, I shall refer to this as “the Central Question”. Grounding skeptics (also 
known as “ground busters”, see Fine 2020), depending on the version of grounding skepticism 
they endorse, respond to the Central Question as follows: either (i) we learn nothing at all from 
the grounding enthusiast’s alleged insight; or (ii) what we learn from the grounding enthusiast’s 
alleged insight can be better stated in terms that do not appeal to the grounding idiom. In either 
case, so the grounding skeptic reasons, the grounding idiom lacks theoretical utility, and we 
therefore might as well continue to go about the business of trying to clarify the nature of the 
factual and/or nonfactual connections at issue without appeal to the grounding idiom.2 
2. Varieties of Grounding Skepticism 
We can distinguish between different varieties of grounding skepticism. Chronologically speak­
ing, the first wave of grounding skepticism, or what I shall call “old-school” skepticism, primar­
ily calls into question the overall coherence or intelligibility of the grounding idiom. Since a 
notion can presumably only be theoretically useful if it is intelligible and coherent, this form 
of skepticism, if successful, would undermine the theoretical utility of the grounding idiom by 
questioning one of its presuppositions.The next wave of grounding skepticism, or what I shall 
call “second-generation” skepticism, focuses not so much on the overall coherence or intel­
ligibility of the grounding idiom but instead challenges the theoretical utility of the grounding 
idiom in other ways. In particular,“second-generation” skeptics raise doubts concerning (i) the 
alleged unifying power of the grounding idiom; (ii) the alleged power of the grounding idiom 
to capture and elucidate the distinction between the fundamental and the nonfundamental; and 
(iii) the alleged metaphysical (as opposed to mind-dependent, epistemic or psychological) utility 
of grounding claims.3 
2.1 “Old-School” Grounding Skepticism 
“Old-school” skepticism finds its expression, for example, in Daly 2012 and Hofweber 2009 (see 
also Clark and Liggins 2012; Kovacs 2017; Rayo 2013, 2014.) According to Chris Daly, ground­
ing theorists can defend the intelligibility of the grounding idiom by opting for one of the fol­
lowing two strategies: they can either take the grounding idiom to be defined in terms whose 
intelligibility can be taken for granted; or they can take the grounding idiom to be primitive 
but convey its meaning in other ways. Primitivists like Paul Audi, Gideon Rosen, and Jonathan 
Schaffer (Audi 2012a, 2012b; Rosen 2010; Schaffer 2009) opt for the latter strategy and try to 
convey the meaning of the grounding idiom by (a) specifying its logical properties, (b) citing its 
connections with other terms, and (c) giving examples. Daly argues that the cumulative effect 
of (a) through (c) nevertheless misses its target. For, first, the logical properties ascribed to the 
grounding idiom (e.g., factivity, referential transparency, well-foundedness, irreflexivity, asymme­























the grounding idiom uniquely. Secondly, the other terms with which the grounding idiom 
might be connected either cannot be taken to be antecedently any more well understood than 
the grounding idiom itself (e.g., “fundamentality”; “degrees of reality”; etc.); or, if these terms 
can plausibly be taken to be antecedently more well understood than the grounding idiom 
(e.g.,“reduction”;“explanation”; etc.), then their connection to the grounding idiom is in turn 
debatable.Thirdly, any putative examples of the grounding idiom, insofar as they are construed 
as applications of an idiom whose intelligibility is in question, will not be any more compre­
hensible to the “old-school” skeptic than the idiom they are meant to illustrate. If, however, the 
examples in question can be construed in other terms whose intelligibility is not in doubt (e.g., 
supervenience, identity), then they of course no longer serve to illustrate the grounding idiom. 
Thus, either way, the “old-school” skeptic will fail to be swayed by the primitivist’s attempt to 
defend the intelligibility of his idiom by citing purported examples of grounding connections. 
In sum, while Daly’s skeptical arguments do not (and are not meant to) establish that the case 
for adding the grounding idiom to our language is completely hopeless, he does take himself to 
have shown that the primitivist’s defense of the intelligibility of the grounding idiom requires 
more than the considerations cited in (a) through (c).We will see that primitivists have, in their 
more recent work, heeded Daly’s advice and adduced additional machinery in response to the 
skeptic’s objections. 
Thomas Hofweber is similarly concerned about the intelligibility of the grounding idiom, 
especially if the grounding idiom is to be accepted as primitive. In Hofweber’s view, the ground­
ing idiom, as it is employed for example in Fine 2001 and Schaffer 2009, is illustrative of a 
style of metaphysics he calls “esoteric”, as opposed to “egalitarian”, metaphysics. Egalitarian 
metaphysics, according to Hofweber, conceives of the discipline of metaphysics as aiming to 
answer questions (e.g., the question of whether change is possible) that are formulated using 
ordinary terms (e.g., “change”), accessible to nonmetaphysicians as well. Esoteric metaphysics, 
in contrast, conceives of the discipline of metaphysics as aiming to answer questions (e.g., the 
question of what grounds what) that are formulated using “distinctively metaphysical terms” 
(e.g.,“ground”), i.e., terms that are either not employed outside of metaphysics at all or at least 
not in the sense in which they are intended to be used by the esoteric metaphysician (Hofweber 
2009: 267). If a “distinctively metaphysical term” is taken as primitive, then there must be some 
way to convey its meaning to “outsiders”; otherwise, so Hofweber reasons, metaphysics becomes 
an objectionably exclusive endeavor into which only those who already profess to be converts 
can gain entry. 
Like Daly, Hofweber is also skeptical that primitivists can avail themselves of the method of 
giving examples to allow “outsiders” to catch on to their “distinctively metaphysical” use of the 
grounding idiom.When they do so, Hofweber argues, primitivists tend to be guilty of a “bait­
and-switch” tactic (Hofweber 2009: 268): the examples they give, insofar as they are intelligible 
to “outsiders” at all, make use of perfectly ordinary notions of priority instead of illustrating the 
“distinctively metaphysical” notion of priority that is supposed to be associated with the primi­
tivist’s use of the grounding idiom.To illustrate, in Hofweber’s view, the relation between a true 
disjunction and its true disjuncts cited earlier in (1.c) is perfectly intelligible to “outsiders”, but 
it does not illustrate a “distinctively metaphysical” notion of priority; rather, it should be under­
stood in terms of logical entailment (viz., the truth of the disjunct logically entails the truth of 
the disjunction, while the converse is not the case).Thus, in each case, in which a purported 
example is supposed to illustrate the “distinctively metaphysical” priority relation associated 
with the grounding idiom, Hofweber’s strategy is to offer some alternative construal in terms 
of a different notion of priority he takes to be perfectly accessible to the “outsider” (e.g., causal, 



















    
 
Skeptical Doubts 
would presumably conclude that no sense at all can be made of the purported application of 
the grounding idiom. At the end of the day, then, primitivists, according to Hofweber, cannot 
succeed in bringing “outsiders” into the fold by citing alleged instances of their “distinctively 
metaphysical” grounding idiom, and those who are concerned about the unintelligibility of a 
“distinctively metaphysical” notion of priority will continue to harbor their “old-school” skep­
tical doubts, even after having encountered a list of alleged instances of the grounding idiom. 
2.2 “Second-Generation” Grounding Skepticism (I): Unity 
As described in the previous section,“old-school” skeptics like Chris Daly and Thomas Hofwe­
ber challenge the theoretical utility of the grounding idiom by denying one of its presupposi­
tions, viz., that the grounding idiom is at least coherent and intelligible. “Second-generation” 
skeptics, in contrast, include theorists who object to the grounding idiom for other reasons, 
even while being willing to grant that the types of connections at play in (1) and (2) cannot 
be understood in terms “old-school” skeptics might find acceptable (e.g., identity, modality, 
parthood, supervenience, realization, causation, counterfactual dependence, logical entailment, 
and the like). In this section, we will consider one such source of skeptical doubts that has 
recently gained traction among “second-generation” skeptics, viz., skeptical doubts concerning 
the alleged power of the grounding idiom to unify what at first sight appears to be a heterogene­
ous collection of factual and/or nonfactual connections, such as those cited in (1) and (2). 
Grounding enthusiasts like Paul Audi, Gideon Rosen, and Jonathan Schaffer have responded 
to the Central Question, in part, by citing the alleged unifying power as one of the main theo­
retical virtues they want to claim for their primitive grounding idiom (Audi 2012b: 689; Rosen 
2010: 114; Schaffer 2009: 376–377). But the hypothesis that all alleged grounding connections 
present us with a unified phenomenon (or what I shall call the “unity hypothesis”) is open to 
several different interpretations of varying strengths, and grounding enthusiasts therefore would 
do well to clarify and provide arguments for the particular version of this hypothesis they wish 
to put forward (Koslicki 2015a: 314ff). In its strongest form, the unity hypothesis holds that all 
alleged grounding connections exhibit a single species of relation or operation.A second, some­
what weaker interpretation posits that distinct specific grounding connections at least form a 
single generic kind.A third, yet weaker, reading requires only that distinct connections which are 
collected together under the single rubric of grounding at least objectively resemble each other in 
certain theoretically significant ways. M. Cameron 2014 expands the range of options further by 
suggesting that Aristotle’s notion of focal meaning (“pros hen” or “core-dependent homonymy”) 
might provide grounding enthusiasts with an additional intermediate option between the sec­
ond “single genus” reading and the third “objective resemblance” reading of the unity hypoth­
esis.According to this reading, distinct uses of the grounding idiom are neither straightforwardly 
equivocal nor straightforwardly univocal; rather, they can all be traced back to a single, yet-to­
be-specified central use of the grounding idiom, just as everything that has being, in Aristotle’s 
view, in some way depends on the primary substances. (See also Rettler 2017 for a defense of 
the view that, while grounding itself is monistic, the term,“grounding” refers to different rela­
tions in different contexts.) 
In response to invitations from “second generation” skeptics like Koslicki 2015a and J.Wilson 
2014 to disambiguate and defend their invocation of the unity hypothesis, grounding enthusiasts 
have appealed to at least the following three types of considerations: (i) the apparent heterogene­
ity of grounding connections should be traced not to differences among the types of connec­
tions at issue but rather to differences among the types of entities that figure in these alleged 


















properties across different uses of the grounding idiom indicates that a single generic type of 
grounding connection is operative in these various contexts (Berker 2017); and (iii) the fact that 
all alleged grounding connections can be described using a single formalism, viz., that utilized by 
structural equations models of causation, supports the hypothesis that all grounding connections 
belong to a single species (A.Wilson 2017) or at least a single genus (Schaffer 2016a, 2016b). (See 
also Kovacs 2017, who—although himself a grounding skeptic—borrows from the literature on 
explanation in the philosophy of science and considers various potential unification strategies 
while ultimately remaining doubtful about their effectiveness.) 
2.2.1 The Source of Heterogeneity 
“Second-generation” skeptics have noted that there are certain obvious apparent differences 
between cases of alleged grounding connections, such as those cited in (1) and (2) (Koslicki 
2015a: 317ff; J.Wilson 2014: 568ff). For example, in the determinate/determinable case illus­
trated in (1.d), if the ball’s being red (all over) is grounded in the ball’s being crimson (all over), 
then that same determinable fact cannot also at the same time be grounded in the ball’s being 
maroon (all over), since a ball cannot simultaneously be both crimson (all over) and maroon (all 
over). In contrast, in the logical case illustrated in (1.c), for example, over-determination of the 
grounded fact by its alleged ground is permissible: a disjunctive fact, such as the ball’s being red 
or round, may obtain because one of its constituent facts obtains (e.g., the ball’s being red), or 
because its other constituent fact obtains (i.e., the ball’s being round), or because both of its con­
stituent facts obtain (viz., the ball’s being red and the ball’s being round). Some such differentiat­
ing feature or combination thereof can be found by means of which each of the cases illustrated 
in (1) and (2) can be distinguished from all the other cases. At best, then, given the apparent 
differences between alleged grounding connections,“second-generation” skeptics conclude that 
the unity hypothesis still stands in further need of justification.At worst, however, if grounding 
enthusiasts are unable to provide plausible arguments in favor of their preferred reading of the 
unity hypothesis, then some form of pluralism concerning the types of connections at play in 
such cases as (1) and (2) seems warranted. 
Grounding enthusiasts like Paul Audi and Michael J. Raven have countered that the appar­
ent heterogeneity visible in the phenomena collected together under the rubric of grounding 
should be blamed on the heterogeneity of the entities that figure in these connections and not 
on the types of connections themselves (Audi 2012b: 689; Raven 2016: 633–634). By way of 
analogy, Raven observes that, in the case of logical entailment, for example, we are not inclined 
to infer from the heterogeneity of cases to which logical entailment can be applied that a 
multiplicity of logical entailment relations must therefore be stipulated.To illustrate, when we 
existentially generalize from an instance, the premise of our inference is more specific than the 
conclusion; in contrast, when we infer a particular instance from a universal generalization, the 
premise of our inference is less specific than its conclusion. Nevertheless, despite this difference 
in specificity, we hold that the logical entailment relation which applies in both cases is the same. 
At this point in the dialectic, the danger, from the point of view of the “second-generation” 
skeptic, is that, when we are asked to abstract away from the details of specific applications of the 
grounding idiom to particular cases, we thereby also in effect lose sight of what is metaphysically 
most interesting and informative about the nature of the connections at issue.To illustrate, as 
Koslicki 2015a and J.Wilson 2014 have pointed out, when we are presented for example with a 
bare factual grounding claim of the form, [p] grounds [q], we are given very little guidance as to 
how to answer philosophically significant more specific questions concerning the relationship 




























not be left open, depending on the particular conception of grounding at issue, is not by any 
means intended to be exhaustive (see J.Wilson 2014 and Koslicki 2015a for additional examples, 
the latter of which also includes questions regarding nonfactual connections that are seemingly 
left unanswered by their paraphrases in terms of the grounding idiom): 
(3)	 a. Is [p] identical with [q]? 
b.	 Are [p] or [q] real or unreal? And if so, in what sense? 
c.	 Is [q] reducible to [p]? And, if so, in what sense? 
d.	 Is the connection between p and q normatively, nomologically, metaphysically, or logi­
cally necessary? 
e.	 Can a special kind of causal efficacy be ascribed to [q] or its constituents? 
f.	 Do [p] or some of its constituents functionally realize [q] or some of its constituents? 
g.	 Do [p] and [q], or some of their constituents, stand in the determinate/determinable 
relation? 
h.	 Do [p] and [q], or some of their constituents, stand in the part/whole relation? 
i.	 Is there a set-theoretic relationship between the constituents of [p] and [q]? 
j. Do the constituents of [p] figure in a real definition of the constituents of [q]? 
. . . 
Unless or until grounding enthusiasts can deliver answers to these and other specific ques­
tions concerning the nature of the connections at issue,“second-generation” skeptics are likely 
to feel that very little philosophical progress has been made toward illuminating the nature of 
the connections at issue by subsuming them under the rubric of grounding.We already knew to 
begin with that some interesting explanatory or dependence relation or other holds in cases to 
which the grounding idiom is applied; but relabeling these connections as grounding connec­
tions does not help us understand any more deeply than we already did at the outset what kind 
of explanatory or dependence relation is operative in each case. In fact, from the perspective 
of those who believe that phenomena such as those cited in (1) and (2) illustrate a plurality of 
distinct dependence relations, subsuming this multiplicity under a single label, if anything, rep­
resents a dialectical step backward, since it suggests the presence of a unitary connection where 
in reality there is none. 
2.2.2 The Preservation of Formal Properties 
Berker 2017 argues in favor of the generic unity of grounding by directing our attention to 
the fact that certain formal properties that are commonly ascribed to the grounding idiom 
(e.g., asymmetry and transitivity) appear to be preserved across different (e.g., normative and 
metaphysical) contexts. Berker develops several specific cases that are intended to bring out that 
the transitivity and asymmetry principles for alleged “mixed” normative/metaphysical cases of 
grounding are just as plausible as the corresponding transitivity and asymmetry principles for 
“pure” cases that purportedly concern only normative or metaphysical grounding connections. 
The best explanation for this apparent preservation of formal properties, in Berker’s view, is that 
a single generic grounding connection is at play in these different contexts. 
Although Berker’s argument is most directly addressed to a view he calls “moderate ground­
ing pluralism”, a modified version of essentially the same argument is also intended to target
a type of view he labels “extreme grounding pluralism”. “Moderate grounding pluralists”, e.g., 
Fine 2012, are not grounding skeptics; rather, these theorists firmly believe in the theoretical



























e.g., metaphysical grounding, normative grounding, and natural grounding (see Richardson
2020).These distinct types of grounding connections, according to the moderate pluralist, are
not reducible to or definable in terms of a single basic type of grounding connection. (See
also Mikkola 2015 for an argument to the effect that, if the grounding idiom is to apply to
social phenomena, then we seem to be pushed toward accepting at least a form of moderate
grounding pluralism; we will return to the issue of how or whether the grounding idiom is
applicable to the domain of social ontology in Section 2.3.2.) By contrast, “extreme ground­
ing pluralists” are grounding skeptics, viz., theorists belonging to the “second generation” of
grounding skepticism (e.g., Koslicki 2015a, 2016; J. Wilson 2014, 2016): extreme grounding
pluralists do call into question the theoretical utility of the grounding idiom and hold instead
that a plurality of irreducible dependence relations is needed to characterize phenomena such
as those cited in (1) and (2). 
To illustrate, consider a normative context, such as that cited in (1.a), in which a natural fact 
(e.g., the fact that an act is a telling of a lie) allegedly normatively grounds a moral fact (e.g., 
the fact that the act in question is morally wrong). Now consider a logical context, such as that 
cited in (1.c), in which a disjunctive fact (e.g., the fact that the act under consideration is either 
morally wrong or not morally wrong) is allegedly grounded in one of its constituent facts (viz., 
the fact that the act in question is morally wrong). Following Fine 2012, such a case is to be 
viewed as an instance of metaphysical grounding, mediated here by the essence of disjunction. 
According to Berker’s mixed transitivity principle, we are now permitted to conclude that the 
natural fact in question (viz., the fact that the act under consideration is a telling of a lie) grounds 
the disjunctive fact (viz., the fact that the act in question is either morally wrong or not morally 
wrong) by way of grounding one of its constituent facts (viz., the fact that the act in question is 
morally wrong).The best explanation for the intuitive plausibility of this inference, and hence 
for the intuitive plausibility of the mixed transitivity principle which licenses this inference, in 
Berker’s view, is that the type of grounding connection that is operative in both contexts is a 
single generic notion of grounding. A similar argument, according to Berker, can be used to 
establish a corresponding result using a mixed asymmetry principle. 
Litland 2018 has replied to Berker’s arguments on behalf of the moderate grounding pluralist. 
And although a response from the point of view of the extreme grounding pluralist has yet to 
be developed, these theorists may well want to mirror and adapt for their own purposes some of 
the moves Litland makes in defense of moderate grounding pluralism. In the case of intuitively 
plausible inferences that appear to be licensed by “mixed” transitivity principles, for example, 
pluralists of any stripe are likely to invoke separate explanatory connections for distinct types 
of contexts (e.g., one type of explanatory connection that accounts for the relation between 
natural and moral facts and a different type of explanatory connection that accounts for the rela­
tion between disjunctive facts and their constituents). In addition, extreme grounding pluralists 
will want to supplement their account with some sort of justification for why chaining together 
distinct explanatory connections is, under certain circumstances, permissible and yields a further 
“non–rigged-up” explanation (Berker 2017: 23–24). 
2.2.3 Positing a Single Formalism 
In defense of the hypothesis that grounding presents us with a unified phenomenon, some 
grounding enthusiasts have proposed to take seriously the idea that grounding either is or 
is at least analogous to a kind of causation, viz., metaphysical causation (see Wang 2020). (In 
what follows, I continue to use the terms “grounding” and “causation”, respectively, for what 





















and “nonmetaphysical” or “nomological causation”, on the other hand.) Jonathan Schaffer, for 
example, defends the weaker view, viz., that grounding is merely analogous to causation (Schaf­
fer 2016a, 2016b), while Alastair Wilson adheres to the stronger view, viz., that grounding lit­
erally is a species of the genus, causation (A. Wilson 2017). More specifically, Schaffer and A. 
Wilson argue that both grounding and causation are best approached through the lens of a 
single formalism, viz., that utilized by SEM (or “structural equation model”) frameworks of 
causation. Defenders of this line of reasoning take the fact that a single formalism can be used to 
characterize both cases to indicate that grounding is at least as unified as causation. (For further 
endorsements of the idea that grounding and causation are in some fashion closely related, see 
also Bennett 2011: 93–94, 2017; Fine 2012: 40; Schaffer 2012: 122; Sider 2011: 145.) 
The legitimacy of the SEM-style argument in favor of the unity hypothesis can be and has 
been challenged on multiple grounds. For one thing, the assumption that the SEM framework in 
fact provides a workable approach to causation is highly controversial (J. Wilson 2016). Secondly, 
even if the plausibility of SEM approaches to causation is granted for the sake of the argument, 
it is debatable whether the SEM framework transfers as smoothly from the case of causation to 
the case of grounding as Schaffer and A.Wilson would have us believe (Koslicki 2016; J. Wilson 
2016).Thirdly, the purported similarities between causation and grounding can also be disputed 
independently of the particulars associated with the SEM framework (Bernstein 2016; Shaheen 
2017). Given these challenges, then, it is fair to say that, SEM-style arguments notwithstanding, 
skeptical doubts concerning the unity hypothesis, at this point, are still alive and well. 
2.3 “Second-Generation” Grounding Skepticism (II): Fundamentality 
In Section 2.2, we considered reasons for and against thinking that the theoretical utility of the 
grounding idiom derives, at least in part, from its alleged power to unify what might otherwise 
strike us as a heterogeneous collection of phenomena. In addition to this first type of response, 
an extremely widespread second response to the Central Question defends the theoretical utility 
of the grounding idiom by appeal to its alleged power to capture and/or elucidate the distinc­
tion between the fundamental and the nonfundamental (see Bliss 2020).Thus, following this 
second style of response to the Central Question, what we learn from being told that a fact, [p], 
is grounded in a fact, [q], is at least in part that [p] is less fundamental than or posterior to [q]; 
that [q] is more fundamental than or prior to [p]; that [p]’s obtaining is not a brute, unexplained 
phenomenon, but rather that [p]’s obtaining is to be explained by appeal to the obtaining of 
some other fact, namely [q]. (An analogous strategy is supposed to apply in nonfactual, non-
propositional cases as well; but see Koslicki 2015a for a discussion of some of the difficulties 
in finding a ground-theoretic way of expressing relative fundamentality relationships among 
nonfactual, nonpropositional entities.) 
Although some version of the second style of response to the Central Question seems to 
be almost universally accepted by grounding enthusiasts, different theorists choose different 
vehicles to give voice to the general sentiment underlying this second response.The following 
partial list illustrates (in no particular order) some of the variations on the general theme just 
cited that are represented in the literature on grounding: among other things, the grounding 
idiom is said to be needed, for example, in order to express the layered hierarchical structure of 
reality (deRosset 2013); to fix the direction of relative fundamentality or priority (R. Cameron 
2016; Raven 2017); to analyze claims concerning ontological dependence and/or the sub­
stance/nonsubstance distinction (Correia 2005, 2008; Rydéhn 2018; Schaffer 2009; Schnieder 
2006, 2020); to formulate a hyperintensional theory of intrinsicness (Bader 2013; Rosen 2010); 















idea that some truths are metaphysically “light-weight” (deRosset 2017: ms.); or to make room 
for a suitable notion of ineliminability (Raven 2016, 2017). Moreover, without their idiom, so 
grounding enthusiasts have argued, it is impossible to understand certain philosophical posi­
tions or substantive disputes in philosophy properly, e.g.: physicalism (Schaffer 2003, 2009); 
the realism/antirealism debate (Fine 2001); the relation between normative ethics, meta-ethics, 
and metaphysics (Berker 2017); disagreements in feminist metaphysics or social ontology more 
generally (Mikkola 2015; Schaffer 2017; Sider 2017); the mind/body problem or the debate 
between substantivalists and relationalists about space (Dasgupta 2014, 2017); as well as the idea 
of sparseness or “nothing-over-and-aboveness” (Bryant 2020; R. Cameron 2008; Leary 2020; 
Passinsky 2020; Ney 2020; Schaffer 2007, 2009, 2010; Solomyak 2020). 
In addition, in the minds of some grounding enthusiasts (e.g., R. Cameron 2016; Schaffer 
2016b), a theory that incorporates the grounding idiom has greater expressive powers than a 
comparable theory that helps itself only to a primitive notion of absolute fundamentality but 
lacks the grounding idiom (J.Wilson 2014, 2016).According to the former type of theory, so the 
reasoning goes, the absolutely fundamental can simply be defined in terms of the relatively fun­
damental, viz., as that which, while being itself ungrounded, serves as a ground for other deriva­
tive phenomena. But the reverse, so these theorists argue, is not the case, since there appears to 
be no similar straightforward mechanism by means of which the relatively fundamental can be 
defined in terms of the absolutely fundamental without implicitly appealing to (some termino­
logical variant of) the grounding idiom. 
2.3.1 Formal Properties of the Grounding Idiom 
Grounding connections are often assumed to be factive, referentially transparent, well founded, 
irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, nonmonotonic, and metaphysically necessary. Overall, given 
these alleged formal properties, grounding enthusiasts have taken their idiom to be suitable for 
the formulation of a hierarchically structured picture of reality, eventually bottoming out in an 
absolutely fundamental layer that in turn fixes and metaphysically explains everything else. But 
various arguments have been mounted in the literature that call into question some of these 
alleged formal properties commonly associated with the grounding idiom. (In some cases, these 
arguments are formulated in terms of ontological dependence rather than grounding; however, 
insofar as grounding enthusiasts are committed to the idea that statements concerning onto­
logical dependence can be understood as grounding claims, the objections in question will also 
affect the grounding idiom.) Barnes 2018, for example, proposes that dependence relations 
should not be assumed to be asymmetric and that this provides a reason for distinguishing 
dependence from ground, assuming that ground must be asymmetric.Thompson 2016a argues 
that grounding should be taken to be nonsymmetric rather than asymmetric (see also Thomp­
son 2020). Jenkins 2011 raises objections against the irreflexivity of dependence. Bliss 2014, R. 
Cameron 2008, Lubrano 2018, Rosen 2010, and others critically discuss the assumption that 
grounding is well founded (see also Dixon 2020). Schaffer 2012 regards explanatory claims as 
contrastive, which calls into question the transitivity of grounding. Rodriguez-Pereyra 2015
puts forward reasons for thinking that grounding is neither irreflexive nor asymmetric nor tran­
sitive. Skiles 2015 has questioned necessitarianism and holds instead that grounding connections 
may be contingent (see also Skiles 2020). On the whole, if these sorts of arguments succeed 
and we have reason to doubt that the grounding idiom really has the formal properties that are 
commonly ascribed to it, then we may in turn wonder whether this notion can in fact be used 
to accomplish the theoretical tasks for which it is intended. In particular, unless the grounding 
















imposing a hierarchical order connecting the (absolutely and/or relatively) fundamental to the 
(absolutely and/or relatively) nonfundamental. 
2.3.2 Potentially Problematic Applications of the Grounding Idiom 
According to the second style of response to the Central Question, the grounding idiom is said to 
furnish us with the preferred concept by means of which to express the connection between the 
(absolutely and/or relatively) fundamental and the (absolutely and/or relatively) nonfundamen­
tal. Recently, however, some critics have questioned whether the grounding idiom can really be 
helpfully applied to nonfundamental phenomena within the social domain (e.g., Barnes 2014, 
2017; Mikkola 2015, 2017). Barnes 2014, for example, writes that ground-theoretic approaches 
to (meta-)metaphysics tend to privilege the absolutely fundamental and characterize existence 
questions as trivial, thereby apparently ruling out the prospect for feminist metaphysics as a sub-
discipline of metaphysics. Such approaches, according to Barnes, make it difficult to appreciate 
the substantivity of certain disputes among feminist philosophers, e.g., concerning the nature 
or existence of gender, since these disputes concern nonfundamental rather than fundamental 
phenomena; moreover, existence questions, in these contexts, are often not regarded as trivial. 
In response, grounding enthusiasts (e.g.,Raven 2017; Schaffer 2017; Sider 2017) have stressed 
that ground-theoretic approaches have the resources to capture the importance of derivative 
phenomena. Raven 2017, for example, replies to Barnes’s concerns by arguing that the mere 
acceptance of ground does not require “fetishizing the fundamental”; rather, so Raven remarks, 
metaphysics is concerned no less with the nonfundamental than with the fundamental:“Much 
of our interest in the fundamental is to use it to account for the nonfundamental” (Raven 2017: 
644). In light of criticisms mounted by Mikkola 2015, which challenge the local applicability of 
ground to value-laden inquiry, Raven notes that ground and value-laden inquiry can coherently 
combine (Raven 2017: 645–649). (See also Passinsky 2020.) 
2.3.3 Alternative Approaches 
Alternatives to ground-theoretic approaches have been proposed in the literature. For example, 
Lipman 2016 argues that, when it comes to a characterization of antirealism, simple error-the­
oretic approaches are preferable to ground-theoretic approaches. In general, so Lipman writes, 
metaphysics must be about what does and does not obtain and should concern itself with ques­
tions of fundamentality only when commonsense or scientific verdicts are lacking or deliver 
conflicting results (Lipman 2016: 604). 
In my own work, I have argued that, in order to arrive at a sufficiently fine-grained approach 
to relative fundamentality for nonfactual, nonpropositional phenomena, we must recognize 
multiple distinct dimensions along which an entity or type of entity may be classified as more or 
less deserving of substance status (Koslicki 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015a, 2015b, 2018). Currently 
available idioms of grounding do not reflect, for example, distinctions among the following 
dimensions of relative fundamentality and nonfundamentality: (i) whether an entity is essentially 
abstracted from something more complex; (ii) whether an entity is essentially constructed out of 
other entities; (iii) whether an entity is natural or artificial (e.g., essentially the result of a creative 
act involving an intentional agent); or (iv) whether an entity is more or less unified. However,
just as one and the same thing can be both good in some respects (e.g., dancing) and bad in 
others (e.g., playing basketball), so one and the same entity, according to the multidimensional 
conception, can also be both more fundamental than another in certain respects (e.g., its degree 
of unity) and less fundamental than another in other respects (e.g., its naturalness or artificiality). 
173 
 
   








      
     






It is only once we make room for multiple dimensions of fundamentality and nonfundamen­
tality, so I argue, that we can do justice to the data that presents itself to the ontologist and 
meta-ontologist. 
A different kind of pluralism has been proposed by J.Wilson 2014, 2016.According to J.Wil­
son, there is no need to posit a grounding idiom (or, in her terms,“big ‘G’ Grounding”), since 
the work for which this notion is intended is in fact already performed by a multiplicity of what 
she calls “small ‘g’ grounding relations” (e.g., parthood, composition, realization, constitution, set 
membership, and the like). In order to account for the directionality of relative fundamentality 
relations, J.Wilson appeals in addition to a primitive notion of absolute fundamentality and to 
further “suppositions/facts about the natures of the non-fundamenta and how (via one or other 
small-g relation) the non-fundamenta stand to one another” (J. Wilson 2016: 195). 
J.Wilson and I thus agree that grounding is too coarse-grained to perform the metaphysical 
work for which it is intended and that a pluralism of some kind is called for to carry out these 
responsibilities properly. But we arrive at these conclusions in different ways and differ with 
respect to certain crucial commitments we take on board along the way. For one thing, I do not 
follow J.Wilson in regarding the relations she calls “small ‘g’ grounding relations” themselves as 
ontological dependence relations. Rather, my own position is that these relations induce different 
varieties of ontological dependence in different circumstances and in different respects.Thus, in 
certain cases and in certain respects, the parts composing a whole may depend on the whole in 
question; and in certain cases and in certain respects, a whole may also depend on its parts. But 
we lose the ability to make these distinctions if we simply view parthood itself as a relation of 
ontological dependence. Secondly and relatedly, I depart from the earlier position of J.Wilson 
2014 that absolute fundamentality together with what she calls “small ‘g’ grounding relations” 
gives us the apparatus sufficient to capture the directionality of relative fundamentality. Even if 
we assume an absolutely fundamental level as fixed, such relations as parthood can still induce 
ontological dependence relations going in both directions, both towards the absolutely funda­
mental and away from the absolutely fundamental. In order to capture the directionality of rela­
tive fundamentality, it is thus necessary to make room for the different varieties of ontological 
dependence, in addition to what J.Wilson calls “small ‘g’ grounding relations”.Thirdly, I am not 
convinced that it is legitimate, from the perspective of a metaphysician, to assume an absolutely 
fundamental level as fixed; rather, like Rosen 2010 and others, I advocate maintaining a neutral 
stance concerning the question of whether relations of relative fundamentality turn out to be 
well founded. (See Schaffer 2016b and J.Wilson 2016 for a recent exchange in which J.Wilson 
addresses some of these concerns.) 
2.4 “Second-Generation” Grounding Skepticism (III): Deflating the 
Grounding Idiom 
Up to this point, we have considered two types of responses to the Central Question: the first 
stresses the alleged power of the grounding idiom to unify an apparently heterogeneous col­
lection of phenomena; the second defends the theoretical utility of the grounding idiom by 
citing its alleged power to capture and elucidate the distinction between the fundamental and 
the nonfundamental. In addition to these two types of responses, I want to end by mention­
ing at least briefly a third possible response to the Central Question.This third reply proceeds 
by recommending a properly deflated conception of the grounding idiom. In response to the 
Central Question, deflationists may allow that something is to be gained by classifying certain 
connections as grounding connections; however, the lessons we learn, so deflationists will stress, 























grounding idiom may have led us to believe (Dasgupta 2017; Maurin 2019; Miller and Norton 
2017; Thompson 2016b). 
Along these lines, Dasgupta 2017, for example, argues that the grounding idiom, as it is
utilized by certain grounding enthusiasts and grounding skeptics alike, has been improp­
erly inflated, with the result that the theoretical usefulness of this notion has thereby been
obscured. Rhetoric aside, the grounding idiom, in Dasgupta’s view, should be understood
as merely playing the role of “limning many issues of intellectual interest” (Dasgupta 2017: 
76–77). Once our expectations of what the grounding idiom can deliver have been appro­
priately adjusted, Dasgupta concludes that the concerns of grounding skeptics can be put to
rest and grounding enthusiasts can still accomplish their goals with a deflated conception of
ground. Despite his assurances to the contrary, however, grounding skeptics may well feel
vindicated by what remains of the grounding idiom after its ambitions have been toned down
in the way Dasgupta indicates. 
A number of critics (e.g.,Maurin 2019; Miller and Norton 2017; Thompson 2016b) also play 
into the hands of the grounding skeptic by objecting that the grounding idiom has been con­
fused with a metaphysical notion, when it in fact represents a psychological, mind-dependent, 
and/or epistemically imbued explanatory mechanism. Thompson 2016b, for example, presses 
grounding enthusiasts to spell out in more detail exactly how they see their grounding idiom 
as being connected to metaphysical explanation and finds that these theorists are then pushed 
toward a pragmatic and agent-centered conception of explanation, thus threatening the pur­
ported mind-independence of grounding connections. Maurin 2019 similarly arrives at the 
skeptical conclusion that more work is required on the part of the grounding enthusiast in order 
to substantiate the purported connection between grounding and metaphysical explanation. 
Miller and Norton 2017 propose to make sense of our grounding-related judgments by way 
of a psychological explanation and without positing a grounding idiom; instead, they appeal to 
cognitive mechanisms that have evolved to detect correlations and causal connections, together 
with the modal apparatus of supervenience, necessitation, and entailment. 
3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we reviewed several varieties of grounding skepticism as well as responses that 
have been proposed by grounding enthusiasts to considerations raised by grounding skeptics. 
Grounding skeptics, as we conceived of them here, are theorists who belong to one of the fol­
lowing two schools of thought. “Old-school” grounding skeptics doubt the theoretical utility 
of the grounding idiom by denying one of its presuppositions, viz., that this notion is at least 
intelligible or coherent. “Second-generation” grounding skeptics call into question the theo­
retical utility of the grounding idiom for other reasons; their skeptical doubts tend to focus on 
one of the following three purported theoretical virtues grounding enthusiasts ascribe to their 
idiom: (i) its alleged power to unify an apparently heterogeneous collection of phenomena; (ii) 
its alleged power to capture and/or elucidate the distinction between the fundamental and the 
non-fundamental; or (iii) the alleged metaphysical (as opposed to mind-dependent, epistemic, or 
psychological) utility of grounding claims.As we have noted, grounding enthusiasts have already 
formulated responses to many of the objections described in this chapter.At this point, however, 
it is fair to say that the state of the literature is still evolving, and no conclusive judgment can 
therefore be reached as of yet as to whether grounding enthusiasts or grounding skeptics have 
gained the upper hand in these debates. In the meantime, though, grounding skeptics continue 
to maintain that the classification of factual and/or nonfactual connections, such as those cited 































connections at issue; instead, from the view of the grounding skeptic, we are better off studying 
these various connections separately and in their own right. 
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Notes 
1	 I use the terms “factual” and “nonfactual” here to draw a distinction between the types of entities that 
can allegedly figure in grounding connections (i.e., whether these entities are facts or propositions or 
whether they are, rather, nonfactual or nonpropositional entities, e.g., objects, properties, relations, and 
the like).The contrast in question is therefore not to be confused with the distinction between “factive” 
and “nonfactive” expressions, e.g., as it pertains to the question of whether grounding claims should be 
regarded as factive or nonfactive. 
2	 What is important, here, is of course the nature of the connection at issue, not the expression(s) we use 
to single out these connections. Thus, if grounding enthusiasts, for example, stopped using the term, 
“grounding” and related expressions (e.g., “ground”, “ground-theoretic”, etc.) but continued to view 
the connections at issue as grounding-connections (under a different label), then grounding enthusiasts 
and grounding skeptics would continue to disagree with one another but use a different vocabulary to 
formulate their dispute. 
3	 We should note here that, since different grounding enthusiasts accept different claims, not every 
grounding enthusiast will recognize their own position in connection with every objection I discuss in 
this chapter.Thus, the skeptical doubts raised in what follows are merely meant to survey the kinds of 
objections that have been mounted against some version or other of grounding enthusiasm defended in 
the literature. Given space constraints, I unfortunately cannot always differentiate between the different 
versions of grounding enthusiasm that are or are not affected by a particular criticism that is being con­
sidered. Moreover, since this chapter is intended to give a survey of skeptical doubts, I am often merely 
reporting what has been said in the literature rather than expressing my own agreement with a particular 
point. In the case of some of the objections I discuss in what follows, grounding enthusiasts can no doubt 
formulate plausible responses (or have already done so). Readers are referred to the references I give if 
they wish to investigate how these debates have played out in the literature in more detail. 
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